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INSURANCE LAW-WRONGFUL CONDUCT OF INSURED-INNOCENT Co-
INSURED-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the
wrongful conduct of one co-trustee in setting fire to a building con-
stituting part of the corpus of a family trust cannot fairly be im-
puted to other co-trustees so as to deny them recovery of their
share of insurance proceeds.
Giacobetti v. Insurance Placement Facility of Pennsylvania, -
Pa. -, 457 A.2d 853 (1983).*
A brick building which had housed a grocery store was destroyed
by fire.1 The building and the land on which it was located were
conveyed in 1954 by Louis Manusov (settlor) to seven named
trustees as a portion of the corpus of the Manusov family trust.2
The trustees included the settlor, his sister Freda Kracoff, his
brother-in-law Charles Kracoff, and four of his nieces and neph-
ews: Harry Kracoff, Doris Kracoff, Sara Stark, and Nathan
Petrushansky.'
When the deed of trust was executed, Charles Kracoff was run-
ning the grocery store in accord with a lease agreement with
Manusov.' The deed of trust expressly allowed Kracoff the right to
continue the lease at his discretion, subject to rental adjustments,
for as long as Kracoff wished.5 The instruments also contained an
assignability clause allowing specified individuals, either severally
* Due to the unavailability of the Giacobetti opinion in the PENNSYLVANIA STATE RE-
PORTS at the time of publication, citations to this reporter have been omitted.
1. Giacobetti v. Insurance Placement Facility of Pa., 457 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1983).
2. Id. Manusov provided in the living trust that maintenance, insurance, taxes and
other expenses in managing the property were to be covered by income from the premises.
In addition, Manusov provided for himself and named grantees, trustees, or their survivors
and successors. Id. Specifically-
Manusov ... directed the payment of $200 per month to himself for the rest of his
life, $300 per year "[t]o each of the Grantees or their survivors and successors," up to
$50 per week to "Grantees, Trustees, or their issue or any member of their respective
families" for care and maintenance in the event of sickness or need," such educa-
tional expenses of children of the trustees as appropriate, and one thousand dollars as
a wedding gift to each trustee's child who should marry.
Id. The trust was to end upon the demise of the last surviving trustee of the originally
designated trustees, as provided for in the deed of trust. At that time, title was to vest in fee
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or jointly, to lease the property on the exact terms available to
Charles Kracoff.1
From 1974, day to day operating responsibilities of the store fell
upon Harry Kracoff, by which time the settlor, and Harry's mother
(Freda) and father (Charles) were deceased.7 A portion of the gro-
cery store's contents including improvements belonged to Charles
Kracoff at his death; title to these contents was held in a trust
created in his will.8 The balance of the grocery store stock and con-
tents were owned outright by Harry Kracoff.9
Harry Kracoff purchased fire insurance from Insurance Place-
ment Facility of Pennsylvania (IPF) in June of 1974.10 The policy
insured the building housing the grocery store for $50,000 and con-
tents of the building for $100,000.11 This "Standard Fire Insurance
Policy" was in effect from June 20, 1974 through June 20, 1975, its
terms and conditions being fixed by statute.
12
On March 25, 1975, IPF issued a "Non-Premium Endorsement"
changing the insured's name13 to "Manusov Family Trust, Harry
Kracoff, Trustee, and Harry Kracoff, A.T.I.M.A." 4 The endorse-
ment also included a "Lenders Loss Payable Clause, ' 15 adding a
6. Id. Those individuals included Charles Kracoff's son, Harry Kracoff, Solomon
Stark and Nathan Petrushansky. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The trustees of the trust created under the will of Charles Kracoff were Harry
Kracoff, Dora Kracoff, Sara Stark, and Nathan Petrushansky, the four remaining co-trust-
ees of the Manusov Family Trust. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.





Immediately below this entry was an additional entry, "MANUSOV FAMILY
TRUST & HARRY KRACOFF, TRUSTEE."
Id.
12. Id. at 855. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 636(2) (1971).
13. 457 A.2d at 855. The original endorsement was to the "Estate of Charles Kracoff,
Manusov Family Trust, Harry Kracoff, trustee." Id.
14. Id. A.T.I.M.A. is a shorthand abbreviation for "as their interests may appear." Id.
at 857. See New Hampshire Ins. v. American Employers Ins., 208 Kan. 532, 533, 492 P.2d
1322, 1324 (1972), where the court noted that "a clause making a fire insurance policy paya-
ble to named insureds as their interest may appear refers to the interests existing at the
time of the loss." Id. at 536, 492 P.2d at 1325 (quoting 5 CoucH ON INSURANCE 2d § 29:109
(2d ed. 1960) (emphasis added)).
15. 457 A.2d at 855 n.1. A lender's loss payable clause is a fire policy clause which lists
the priority of claims in event of the destruction of the property insured. Generally, a mort-
gagee, or beneficiary under a deed of trust, is named in the clause and paid the amount
1164
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mortgagee to the policy as a payee in addition to those insured
under the "Non-Premium Endorsement."'"
In April of 1975 the insured property and its contents were de-
stroyed by fire. 17 Harry Kracoff submitted the appropriate affida-
vits of loss showing that the fire damage was greater than the in-
surance coverage on the building and its contents."8 Kracoff swore
in the affidavits that the cause of the fire was unknown to him, but
IPF determined that Kracoff started the fire and consequently re-
fused to pay the claim."
The plaintiffs filed a claim against IPF on January 6, 1976 with a
complaint comprised of two counts: the first for an award in the
amount of $50,000 for damage to the building,2" and the second for
$100,000 as coverage on the contents of the building.2' IPF claimed
that Kracoff's affidavit of loss was purposefully falsified as to the
true origin of the fire.22 The insurance company further claimed
that the proof of loss was made with the intent to deceive it, and
therefore Kracoff breached the "Concealment, Fraud" clause of the
policy. 23 The insurer also denied liability for loss under the "Perils
owing under the mortgage or deed of trust before the owner is paid. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 852 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
16. 457 A.2d at 855 n.1. The lenders loss payable clause provided that the mortgagee's
interest "shall not be impaired or invalidated by any act or neglect of the borrower, mortga-
gor or owner of the within described property .... " In accordance with this clause, IPF
paid the mortgagee $64,374.25 just after the instant case commenced. Id. See generally
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 437 Pa. 463, 263 A.2d 448 (1970),
where a conditional vendor financing restaurant equipment told his insurance agent the he
wished to be named in seven fire insurance policies under a lender's loss payable clause that
would specifically insure the conditional vendor regardless of the loss. The conditional ven-
dor was named in only five policies and was therefore not protected when the insured com-
mitted arson. Id. at 463, 263 A.2d at 451.
17. 457 A.2d at 855.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The first count was requested by the four plaintiffs, Harry Kracoff, Doris
Kracoff, Sara Stark, and Nathan Petrushansky, in their capacity as trustees of the Manusov
Family Trust. Id. See supra note 8.
21. 457 A.2d at 855. The second count was requested by the four plaintiffs, in their
capacity as trustees of the Charles Kracoff trust, and by Harry Kracoff in his own right. Id.
22. id.
23. Id. at 855 n.2. The "Concealment, Fraud" clause stated:
This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss, the insured has
wilfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance concerning
this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the insured therein, or in case
of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating thereto.
Id. See infra notes 105-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term "insured"
with respect to "Concealment, Fraud" clauses.
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Not Included" clause, " repeating its contention that plaintiffs had
materially aided in the cause of the fire and any subsequent
losses.2
Sitting without a jury, Judge Bullock of the Court of the Com-
mon Pleas of Philadelphia County found for IPF on both counts.2 6
The judge determined that the fire had been prearranged by some-
one with inside knowledge, rather than an "angry outsider" as
Harry Kracoff had maintained, and resolved that the fire had been
started by Harry.
2 7
In denying recovery of the insurance proceeds to the plaintiffs,
Judge Bullock imputed Harry's tortious conduct to the other trust-
ees based on the premise that Harry acted as an agent for those
having an interest in the trust res.28 The court reasoned that the
co-trustees had acquiesced in Harry's exclusive control of the busi-
ness prior to the fire, and therefore the remaining co-trustees were
bound by Harry's actions.2
Exceptions were made by plaintiffs in their capacity as co-trust-
ees.8 0 They did not disagree with the factual finding that Harry
caused the fire to be set, but they did contest the court's decision
that all interests, including those of unborn children, minors, and
remaindermen, were inescapably tied to Harry's wrongful con-
duct."' On February 2, 1979 the court dismissed all of the
exceptions.
32
After the exceptions were dismissed, Doris Kracoff and Sara
Stark resigned as trustees and the Orphans Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia granted a petition for ap-
pointment of a substitute trustee, Alexander B. Giacobetti, Es-
quire. 8 Giacobetti appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed
24. 457 A.2d at 855. That clause absolves the insurer of liability where the loss was
caused directly or indirectly by failure of the insured to use all reasonable means to save
and preserve the property. Id.
25. Id.
26. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, No. 257 January Term, 1976.
27. Id. Only Harry Kracoff and Leon Bryn, Harry's son-in-law, were present in the
store on the date of the fire. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court further stated that it could not see how future beneficiaries of the
trust might have independent standing. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
30. 457 A.2d at 856.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court acknowledged that the remaindermen were innocent, but that they
were also natural objects of the bounty of Harry Kracoff and his co-trustees. Their right to




the judgment in a per curiam order.34 Upon review, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania vacated the decision of both lower courts
and remanded the case to the court of common pleas.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing-for a unanimous court,3 6 -agreed
with the court of common pleas that Harry Kracoff's wrongful ac-
tions prevented him and his beneficiaries from sharing in any dis-
tribution of the fire insurance proceeds.8 7 Chief Justice Roberts
further explained that the insurer's right to hold Harry's and his
beneficiaries' share of the insurance proceeds was not dependent
upon the "Release and Disclaimer" executed by Harry.88 He ob-
served that IPF's claim to this portion of the proceeds is based on
the common law principle as enunciated at least once before by the
Pennsylvania high court,39 that a person may not profit from his
own wrong, particularly if the wrong is criminal.
4 0
In considering the trial court's decision that the other benefi-
ciaries under the Manusov Family Trust are not privileged to re-
tain the insurance proceeds, the court disagreed. 1 Examining the
findings of the court of- common pleas, the court agreed that Harry
Kracoff acted on his own in starting the blaze and that there was
no evidence that the other income beneficiaries under the trust
abetted or condoned the wrongful conduct of Harry Kracoff. 2
Consequently, the court found no basis for preventing the other
beneficiaries from recovering the fire insurance proceeds. 3
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Harry Kracoff's wrongful
actions could not be imputed to the trust or to the beneficiaries."
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 5 Chief Justice Roberts
34. 287 Pa. Super. 590, 428 A.2d 252 (1979).
35. 457 A.2d at 857.
36. Former Chief Justice O'Brien took no part in the decision of-the case. Id. at 853.
37. Id. at 856. Beneficiaries are Harry Kracoff's "children or issue" under the Manusov
Family Trust. Id.
38. Id. at 857.
39. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of In re Greifer's Estate, 333
Pa. 278, 5 A.2d 118 (1939), held that a wife who murdered her husband and then attempted
to claim benefits under a trust covering life insurance policies on the husband's life is barred
from taking those benefits by the common law principle that a person will not be permitted
to profit by his own wrong, particularly by his own crime. Id. at 279, 5 A.2d at 119.





45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 276 comment a (1959), states that "[a] trustee
as such is not an agent of the beneficiary.. . and has no power to subject the beneficiary to
personal liability for his torts." Id.
1984- 1.167
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noted that while a trustee is not an agent of the beneficiary, over
the passage of time, the other trustee-beneficiaries had assented to
Harry Kracoff's increasing assumption of responsibility under the
trust indenture, including that of obtaining insurance on the trust
res.46 Chief Justice Roberts found, however, that the insurer had
met its burden of showing that Harry Kracoff had become an agent
of the trust and all beneficiaries for all purposes, such that the re-
maining trustee-beneficiaries should be denied recovery of the in-
surance proceeds. 7 Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded
the case to the court of common pleas. 8
Until recently, it was generally the rule in this country that
where one of two or more insureds intentionally caused the loss to
the insured property, the remaining insureds, although entirely in-
nocent of any wrongdoing, could not recover.' 9 The primary rea-
sons advanced to support this rule are based on fraud and that it is
impossible to separate the interests of other co-insureds in the
property.50 The most typical set of circumstances out of which this
issue arises occurs when arson is committed by one spouse without
the knowledge or cooperation of the other. In addition, loss situa-
tions involving trust beneficiaries, corporate co-insureds, partners,
and landlords and tenants illustrate the same issue and have
evoked the same arguments for and against recovery.51
The issue of whether an insured's fraud by deliberate burning of
property jointly owned is imputed to co-insureds is not one of first
impression in Pennsylvania, although it is in the case of a trustee's
incendiary act against trust property. To begin, there exists a well
recognized common law principle that a person will not be permit-
ted to profit by his own wrong, particularly his own crime. 2 This
policy applies to fire insurance claims, thereby forbidding recovery
to insureds who fraudulently and intentionally set fire to property
covered by an insurance contract,53 as well as simultaneously deny-
46. 457 A.2d at 857.
47. Id. The court also concluded that the insured could not deny recovery based on
the "Concealment, Fraud" and "Perils Not Included" clauses on the basis that Harry
Kracoff's conduct could not be deemed an action of the trust. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., American Economy Ins. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 137 (3d Dist. Ind. Ct.
App. 1981).
50. Id. at 137, 138. The standard fire insurance policy contains the provision that
voids the policy in the event of fraud by the insured. Id. See supra note 12.
51. Arson Recovery By Innocent Co-Insureds, Fire & Casualty Cas. (CCH), Fire &
Marine Section, at CW-1 (July 1981).
52. See supra note 39.
53. See, e.g., General Electric Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 437 Pa. 463,
Vol. 22:11631168
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ing recovery to innocent co-insureds.
In Matyuf v. Phoenix Insurance Co.,' 4 a Washington County
Court of Common Pleas judge not only applied the above men-
tioned principle, but held that the acts of the husband in destroy-
ing the insured property barred his wife's recovery even though she
was not involved in his fraudulent act.5" This was predicated on
the theory that:
[W]hen two joint owners of property (especially if they hold by entireties)
are jointly insured by one policy, it is implied by the very nature and funda-
mental purpose of the insurance contract that both of the assureds shall
observe good faith toward the insurer, and that a fraudulent and felonious
burning by either of the joint owners who are jointly insured is not included
within the contemplated risks."
Further, permitting a recovery by the innocent spouse of one-half
the proceeds of the policy would be, in effect, to substitute another
contract in place of the one made to protect the indivisible owner-
ship by the entireties.' 7
In an earlier Pennsylvania case, Bowers Company v. London As-
surance Corp.,"s the superior -court concluded that the contract in-
sured the assureds jointly. The named assureds were "John A.
Perry and L. S. Bowers Company, as their interests may appear."'59
Bowers Company, a car dealership, sold a car to Perry under a
bailment lease which required Perry to insure the car against dam-
age by fire; the proceeds of any loss were payable to Bowers as its
interest might appear. 0 Until final payment had been made and
Perry owned the whole interest in the car, Perry and Bowers pos-
sessed joint interest in the policy, 1 as distinguished from the auto-
mobile, where the interests are distinct and enforceable by sepa-
rate actions regardless of the rights of a co-insured.' The court
473, 263 A.2d 448, 454 (1970) and Owl & Turtle, Inc. v. Travelers Indem., 554 F.2d 196, 198
(5th Cir. 1977), citing as settled law that principles of public policy deny the right of recov-
ery to an insured who fraudulently sets on fire property covered by an insurance contract.
54. 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351 (CP. Wash. 1933). This opinion was unreported for 29 years
until the Superior Court of Pennsylvania cited the opinion and caused it to be published in
Taylor v. Seckinger, 199 Pa. Super. 262, 184 A.2d 317 (1962).
55. 27 Pa. D. & C.2d at 365.
56. Id. at 365.
57. Id. at 359.
58. 90 Pa. Super. 121 (1926).
59. Id. at 122.
60. Id. at 123.
61. Id. at 124.
62. The holding in this regard was based on language in the policy restricting coverage
to the named insureds "as their interest may appear." The Bowers court noted:
1984 1169
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found that "the policy did not purport to. insure the interests of
the assured in severalty but jointly, the two interests combined
constituting one whole subject of insurance." 3 The court deter-
mined, therefore, that Bowers would be prevented from recovering
on the policy if it were established that Perry had fraudulently
burned the car. 4
Another case applying Pennsylvania law and supporting the
traditional no-recovery view is Mele v. All Star Insurance Corp.,6"
where a fire destroyed a building owned by the plaintiffs, husband
and wife. It was found that the fire was of an incendiary origin that
was caused to be set by the husband, and thus the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant insurer." The plaintiffs in their post trial
motions argued that the court committed fundamental error in re-
fusing to charge that the plaintiff wife was entitled to recover mon-
etary damages irrespective of the jury's verdict as to the alleged
arson by her husband. Chief Judge Joseph S. Lord, III, of the Fed-
eral District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, how-
ever, charged the jury that under Pennsylvania. law a wife as co-
owner of the insured property with her husband and co-insured on
a policy, would be barred from any recovery under that policy if
her husband was responsible for the fire. 7
The Mele court found that the Bowers rationale, applied, but
noted that the interests of the co-insureds in Bowers were not the
same as the interests of the husband and wife before it." Never-
theless, Chief Judge Lord determined that the "clear albeit some-
what vintage position of the Pennsylvania courts" bound him to
conclude that Mrs. Mele, the innocent spouse, was barred by the
fraudulent acts of her husband, if the jury determined he was re-
sponsible for the fire.69
This is a recognition that the quantities of the respective interests might vary. from
time to time, as payments were made on account of the contract, and that the charac-
ter of interest might not be precisely alike nor the quality the same, but is not evi-
dence of an intention to insure such varying interests separately, so as to permit sepa-
rate actions on the policy with the same effect as if separate policies had been issued
Id. at 125.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 127.
65. 453 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
66. Id. at 1339.
67. Id. at 1341.
68. Id. at 1342. See Opat v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 1321, 1325
(W.D. Pa. 1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 138-150.
69. 453 F. Supp. at 1342.
1170 Vol. 22:1163
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A majority of the courts in other jurisdictions which have ex-
amined the issue have ruled that the fraud of one co-owner vitiates
the policy as to the other. 0 Massachusetts, for example, follows
this approach."1 In one such case, a woman whose husband had
intentionally burned buildings owned by the couple as tenants in
common conceded that, at law, her husband's act rendered the fire
insurance policy in both of their names void.7' The wife was in no
way connected with the fire, but the court held that the policy was
joint and that the wife could not maintain a suit in equity, to re-
cover her interest.7 1 In ruling against the wife, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts pointed out that the status of the hus-
band and wife as joint insureds (not as insureds each with a
separately protected interest) was a feature of the policy upon
which the insurer was entitled to rely, a feature that could not be
rewritten by the court.74 The court premised its conclusion on the
finding that the policy was joint and that the husband's action of
burning the insured structures was an act of the "insured," there-
fore, fraud perpetrated against the insurer rendered the policies
void in accordance with the policy language.75
The principle of joint responsibility of joint insureds was simi-
larly adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.76 There, -following
the husband's conviction for arson in the burning of the couple's
home, the wife sought to recover under the fire insurance policy
issued to them jointly. She maintained that her husband's wrong-
ful act should not preclude her from recovery, however, the policy
contained provisions stating that the insurer was not liable for loss
caused by the, neglect of the insured,77 and that the policy should
be void in any case of fraud by the insured. 7 The court held 'that
70. See, e.g., Ryan v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 610 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980),
where the court listed Alabama, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Texas, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin as jurisdictions which have adhered to the traditional rule. Id. at.429.
See also 18 CoucH ON INSURANCE § 74:663-77 (2d ed. 1983) (compiling cases following the
traditional rule).
71. Kosier v. Continental Ins., 299 Mass. 601, 13 N.E.2d 423 (1938).
72. Id. at 603, 13 N.E.2d at 424.
73. Id. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 450, 452 (1969). See, e.g., Bridges v. Commercial Stan-
dard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) and Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire.Ins.
Co., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121 (1942).
74. Arson Recovery By Innocent Co-Insureds, Fire & Casualty Cas. (CCH), Fire &
Marine Section, at CW-1 (July 1981).
75. 299 Mass. at 604, 13 N.E.2d at 425.
76. Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins., 8 Wis. 2d 565, 99 N.W.2d 865 (1959).
77. Id. at 566, 99 N.W.2d at 866.
78. Id. The "Concealment, Fraud" clause under the Wisconsin standard policy is sub
stantially similar to that used in Giacobetti. See supra note 23.
1984 171
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since the policy was in the joint names of the insureds, the in-
sureds had undertaken an obligation that each would not commit
neglect and that the breach of the policy caused by the willful de-
struction of the insured property by a co-insured is chargeable to
both insureds and thereby precludes recovery by the innocent joint
insured.' The court barred recovery by the innocent spouse not on
the basis of the indivisibility of the joint interests in the insured
property, but because of the joint duties of the co-insured parties
to comply with the terms of the policies."0
The Supreme Court of Vermont considered the issue in a case
where a husband willfully burned property that' he and his wife
had jointly insured."1 Assuming misconduct by the husband would
not bar recovery by the innocent wife, the court stated that her
interest in the property could not be determined because the prop-
erty was held as tenants by the entireties, and therefore she could
not be permitted recovery."s Invoking the logic of the Matyuf deci-
sion, 8 the court advanced a second ground for denying recovery on
the basis that a recovery by the wife would be to substitute an-
other contract in place of the one made to protect the entireties
ownership."
Virginia is typical of all jurisdictions that have followed the
traditional line of no recovery. The Supreme Court of Virginia held
that an innocent wife was not entitled to keep her share of the
proceeds from a homeowner's policy for property owned by the
couple as tenants by the entireties where destruction of the prop-
erty was caused by the incendiary act of the husband. 5 The court
disposed of the issue summarily, stating simply that the legal in-
terest in the subject matter of the policy was joint and not
severable."
While decisions prohibiting recovery by innocent co-insureds in
arson losses are rooted in a long series of cases, there is a growing
79. 8 Wis. 2d at 567, 99 N.W.2d at 866.
80. Id. at 568, 99 N.W.2d at 867. See Comment, Spouse's Fraud as Bar to Insurance
Recovery, 21 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 543, 547 (1979).
81. Cooperative Fire Ins. Ass'n of Vermont v. Domina, 137 Vt. 3, 4, 399 A.2d 502, 503
(1979). The husband was convicted of second degree arson in connection with the fire. Id.
82. Id. at 5, 399 A.2d at 503.
83. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
84. 137 Vt. at 5, 399 A.2d at 503.
85. Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 219 Va. 803, 807, 250 S.E.2d 774, 776
(1979).
86. Id. at 806, 250 S.E.2d at 776. See Comment, supra note 80.
1172 Vol. 22:1163
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movement favoring recovery.8 7 The first of these rulings emanates
from the New Hampshire Supreme Court.88 The New Hampshire
case involved the loss by fire of property owned by three tenants in
common. The fire which destroyed the property was purposefully
set by one of the three owners who subsequently pleaded guilty to
an indictment charging him with arson.8' There was no evidence
that the other co-owners had any guilty knowledge of the fire."0
Notwithstanding the fact that the fire insurance policy Was issued
in the names of all the tenants in common, the New Hampshire
court held that the innocent co-insureds may recover on the basis
of the "reasonable expectation" theory of policy construction. 1
The Appellate Court of Illinois adopted the New Hampshire ap-
proach by holding for an innocent co-insured husband whose wife
burned the home which they had owned as joint tenants." Apply-
ing the reasonable expectation theory, the Illinois court held that if
the insurance company had intended the wrongdoing of a co-in-
sured to be imputed to the innocent co-insured, it should have
made the policy language expressly clear in that regard, so that a
87. Representing the emerging pro-recovery view are jurisdictions such as Pennsylva-
nia, California, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Alabama, Michigani
Maine, Delaware and Florida. See 11 A.L.R.4th, 1228, 1231 (1982).
88. Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121 (1942).
89. Id., 29 A.2d at 122.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 243, 29 A.2d at 123. The reasonable expectation. theory as stated by the
Hoyt court considers:
The mere fact that the language employed may be sufficient to "express a joint cove-
nant" is not conclusive. Whether the rights of obligees are joint or several is a ques-
tion of construction, and in construing an insurance contract the test is not what the
insurance company intended the words of the policy to mean but what a reasonable
person in the position of the insured would have understood them to mean.
Id. (citations omitted). The court further stated:
The ordinary person owning an undivided interest in property, not versed in the nice
distinctions of insurance law, would naturally suppose that his individual interest. in
the property was covered by a policy which named him without qualification as one
of the persons insured. And the fact that under such circumstances the insurance
company may have had good reasons for preferring to issue a joint policy is unimpor-
tant unless those reasons were disclosed.
Id. (citations omitted).
The reasonable expectation theory has been adopted in Pennsylvania. In Collister v. Na-
tionwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 594, 388 A.2d 1346, 1352 (1978), the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that it was a reasonable expectation of the insured wife to believe that the
insurer was providing interim life insurance benefits when her husband, the life insurance
applicant, died between the insurer's receipt of the application and premium deposit and
the date of the medical examination. The insured wife.brought an action against the insurer
to recover benefits when the insurer denied liability, asserting that certain conditions in the
application had not been fulfilled by the applicant. Id. at 582, 388 A.2d at 1347.
92. Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Warren, 71 Ill. App. 3d 625, 390 N.E.2d 361 (1979).
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reasonable person in the position of an innocent co-insured could
have expected that result.'-
Recovery has been allowed even where the form of ownership is
by tenants by the entirety. The Law Division of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in considering whether the co-insured wife
may collect fire insurance benefits resulting from the husband's in-
tentional burning of the family home, held that the fraud of the
husband did not prohibit recovery under the policy by the inno-
cent wife.94 The court noted that the outmoded metaphysical con-
cept of tenants by the entireties, based on the legal fiction of the
"oneness" of husband and wife could be used as a basis for deny-
ing. recovery to the innocent spouse,95 but concluded that the inter-
ests under the insurance policy are several and not joint, and thus
not subject to divestment or forfeiture by the singular actions of
one. spouse.9
On appeal in the same. case, the Appellate Division of the Super-
ior Court of New Jersey 97 reached the same result, but reasoned
that the primary factor in allowing the innocent wife recovery is
that responsibility for the fraud was several and separate rather
than joint and that the husband's fraud cannot be imputed to the
wife regardless of the property rights or contract rights being joint
or several.98 Additional support for the court's holding was based
on the ambiguous use of the term "and/or" in listing the named
insured under the policy;99 the court simply applied the public pol-
icy argument of resolving the ambiguity against the insurer and in
favor of the innocent co-insured wife. 100
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Delaware used an ambiguity in
the insurance policy as the primary basis for allowing recovery by
93. Id. at 629, 390 N.E.2d at 364.
94. Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., -124 N.J. Super. 414, 419, 307 A.2d 142, 145 (1973),
modified by -130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974).
95. 124 N.J. Super. at 417, 307 A.2d at 144.
96. Id. at 419, 307 A.2d at 145.
97. Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974).
98. Id. at 354, 327 A.2d at 242.
99. Id. at 355, 327 A.2d at 242. In the policy the named insured was listed as "Gene K.
Howell and/or Donna L. h/w," Id. at 353, 327 A.2d at 241.
100. Id. at 355, 327 A.2d at 242. Considering the use of language in the policy, the
court stated:
[U]nless the terms thereof are plainly to the contrary and in some fashion clearly
called to the attention of the insureds, the obligation of the carrier should be consid-
ered several as to each person insured, and the fraud or misconduct of one insured
should not bar recovery by the innocent co-insureds to the extent of their respective
interests in the property involved.
Id. at 356, 327 A.2d at 243.
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an. innocent co-insured. 101 Focusing upon the word "insured" as it
appeared in the "Concealment, Fraud" provision of the insurance
contract, 102 the court noted that where language of an insurance
contract is ambiguous, it should be construed strongly against the
drafting insurance company. 05 The Delaware Supreme Court also
applied the reasonable expectation. theory -to hold that a contract
of insurance should be read in congruity with the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured so far as the: language will allow..04
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine- followed the lead of Dela-
ware in construing the term "insured" in the "Concealment,
Fraud" provision of the fire policy as referring to the specific in-
sured.who is responsible for causing the loss and is seeking to re-
cover under the policy, and not jointly to all insureds. 0 Thus, re-
covery was allowed for the innocent spouse, despite the fact the
term "insured" as defined in one section of the policy included
both spouses if they lived in the same household.06
Summarizing the "ambiguities theory" as used by some, courts to
permit recovery is a Tennessee Court of Appeals decision involving
a wife's arson and her husband's attempt to collect the fire insur-
ance proceeds. 0 7 The Tennessee court undertook a detailed survey
of the precedent both for and against recovery and determined
that the new majority rule provided a better reasoned approach
and a more equitable result.0 8 The court held that provisions in
the standard fire insurance policy, 09 such as fraud of the insured,
or neglect of. the insured, should be construed to mean that if an
insured is guilty of fraud or neglect or of increasing a hazard to the
property, then he or she may not recover under the policy."" Void-
ing of coverage with respect to all co-insureds on the basis of one
101. Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398 (Del. 1978).
102. See supra note 23. This provision is substantially similar to that used in the
Giacobetti policy.
103. 384 A.2d at 400. This rule has been adopted in Pennsylvania. See Papadell v.
Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co., 411 Pa. 214, 191 A.2d 274 (1963); Evans v. Baltimore Life
Ins. Co., 216 Pa. Super. 425, 268 A.2d 155 (1970).
104. 384 A.2d at 401.
105. Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 331 (Me. 1978).
106. Id. The policy provided under the "general conditions" section that "[tihe un-
qualified word 'insured' includes (1) the Named Insured and (2) if residents of his house-
hold, his spouse, the relative of either, and any other person under the age of twenty-one in
the care of an Insured." Id.
107. Ryan v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 610 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
108. Id. at 437.
109. The standard fire insurance policy of the State of Tennessee is substantially simi-
lar to that of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. at 438-40. See supra note 12.
110. 610 S.W.2d at 437.
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insured's fraud or neglect would bar recovery only if made clear
and unambiguous in the policy and if the insurer informed all pro-
spective applicants. of the insurance company's position from the
beginning.. ' .
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in analyzing the question of
recovery by an innocent co-insured, observed that this has been a
problem Vexing the appellate courts of many jurisdictions for sev-
eral years 11 The court believed that the crucial question was not
whether the co-tenants were married, or joint property owners
lacking the marital relationship, since in either of these cases a
joint interest in the insured property exists,113 but what the parties
intended, and thus. whether the contract sets forth the obligations
of the co-insureds as joint or several 11 ' Thus, the decision. was
based on the-law applied to a contract dispute rather than the law
governing land titles."'
The public policy considerations'supporting the position that
the tortious conduct of one insured does not bar the claim of an
innocent co-insured were presented by the IndianaCourt of Ap-
peals. 1 ' The court, in reiterating the well known principle that the
law does not permit a guilty party to profit from his own wrongdo-
ing,117' stated that the "arsonist whose business is failing. . . must
not be permitted, as- a matter of public policy, to find a way out of
his dilemma by setting a fire."11' This form of public policy, how-
ever, is easily achieved by denying recovery to the guilty co-insured
and permitting the innocent co-insured recovery within the policy
limits.11 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted the
.stance of the Indiana court on the question of whether an innocent
partner can recover where his partner had intentionally destroyed
the property.2 0 Commenting on this situation the New Jersey
court stated that recovery should not be precluded provided the
111. Id.
112. St. Paul Fire and Marine ins. Co. V. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 147, 433 A.2d i135,
i139 (1981).
113. Id. at 149, 433 A.2d at 1140.
114. Id. at 150, 433 A.2d at 1140.
115. Id. at 151, 433 A.2d at 1141.
116. American Ec0nomy Ins. Co. V. Liggett, 426 
N..2d 136 (Ind. App. 1981).
117. See supra note 39.
118. 426 N.E.2d at 140.
119. Id. The dourt further stated that "[wihere there is some prospect that the guilty
party might benefit, even indirectly, a carefUl factual analysis can be made by the trial court
to determine whether that prospect exists and to protect against it." Id. (citations omitted).
120. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978).
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wrongdoer does not benefit.1' 1
Perhaps the most significant case in light of Giacobetti is Mer
cantile Trust Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co.,"$ a diversity
action in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which per-
mitted recovery by the trustee and residuary beneficiary: despite
the fraud of the life. beneficiary who obtained the fire insurance
policy.128 The court stated that an insurance contract is indivisible
as to risk, but that the issue of whether fraud of an insured would
bar recovery by an innocent co-insured was not clear~cut.lu The
issue was whether the trustee's interest in the house was divisible
claimant-wise from the life beneficiary's interest in the contents.181
After reviewing several cases that permit recovery by an innocent
co-insured, the court found Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. '
and its progeny persuasive, for the-trustee was unaware of the life
beneficiary's tortious conduct, nor did it have any control over the
property in question.1 27
Also significant in light of Giacobetti is the holding in Mercan-
tile as it relates to the innocent remainderman. Edward Luer
owned a beneficial life interest in the property. As a result, the
court did not believe that Illinois law would impute Edward Luer's
fraud to the trustee whowas an innocent co-insured, or to his son,
Frank Luer, the innocent remainderman.128 In addition, the
$20,000 proceeds collected by the trustee for destruction of the res-
idence was to be held for the descendants of the life beneficiary,
Edward Luer, so that he would not profit from his wrongdoing.1"'
As the Supreme Court of Maine indicated, "mere family relation-
ship of the arsonist which does not bestow a property right or
other direct benefit in the proceeds of insurance does not bar a
recovery."
30
121. Id. at 483, 388 A.2d at 606.
122. 376 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1967).
123. Id. at 506.
124. Id. at 505.
125. Id.
126. 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121 (1942). See supra text accompanying notes 88.91.
127. 376 F.2d at 506.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court indicated that this suggestion accords with sound principles of trust
and property law and adopted it so that Edward Luer could not profit from his wrongdoing.
d. See G, BOGERT, TRusT & TRUSnES § 471 (2d ed. 1960) and REsTATEMENT OF PRoPmRm §
138 (1936).
130. Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1978) (quoting
Erlin-Lawler Enterprises v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 267 Cal. App. 2d 381, 386, 73 Cal. Rptr. 18,
186 (1968) (which involves arson with a dominant party in a corporation).
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Illustrative of the Pennsylvania cases that favor recovery of an
innocent co-insured is an opinion by Judge McCune of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in
Opat v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.' 3 ' There the
issue was whether- the actions of one insured spouse in burning a
dwelling held as tenants by the entireties barred recovery by the
innocent, co-insured spouse under Pennsylvania law. Prior to
Giacobetti, however, -neither the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor
the Pennsylvania Superior Court had addressed the precise is-
sue."3 2 Thus, Judge McCune turned to Matyuf,5 3 Bowers13 4 and
Mele,1 5 all of which had held that. an innocent spouse is barred
from recovery by the fraudulent act of a guilty spouse.' Notwith-
standing the Pennsylvania approach, Judge McCune reached the
opposite result citing in part a Maryland Court of Appeals decision
in St. Paul Fire & Marine. Insurance Co. v. Molloy. '
Judge McCune stated Mele and Bowers'were not controlling to
the extent that those rulings were based on the assumption that
the property covered by the policy was jointly held, and that the
policy itself was a joint contract.3 3 Further, Judge McCune rea-
soned that even if he were to apply the rule of Bowers, that the
fraud of one insured bars recovery by the non-culpable insured, it
was necessary to determine whether the insurance policy in this
case was a joint contract.13 9 Applying the rules of contract con-
struction to give the words- of the policy a reasonable interpreta-
tion, Judge McCune analyzed the definition of "insured" in the in-
surance contract and concluded that "nothing in the -policy
sections that define the 'insureds' sheds any light on whether the
obligations of the insureds are joint or several."' 4 .
Judge McCune also chose not to presume that the insurance pol-
icy covers the joint interest simply because the insured property is
131. 542 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Pa. 1982). In this case the husband and wife owned a
residence as tenants by the entireties which was destroyed by fire. The wife was found to
have committed the arson in concert with her brother-in-law. Id. at 1321.
132. Id. at 1324.
133. Matyuf v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d'351 (Wash. 1933).
134. Bowers v. London Assurance Corp., 90 Pa. Super. 121 (1926).
135. Mele v. All Star Ins. Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
.136. 542 F. Supp. at 1325.
137. See 291 Md. 139, 433 A.2d 1135 (1981). See supra note 112-115 and accompany-
ing text.
138. 542 F. Supp. at 1325.
139. Id.




jointly owned. Instead, he recognized that the legal fiction of the
"oneness" of husband and wife has largely disappeared and that
today, separate property ownership by spouses is common.14 The
principle was also acknowledged that one spouse cannot be held
vicariously liable for the tortious acts of the other solely because of
the marital relationship. " ' Attempting to predict how the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania would rule, Judge McCune held the inter-
ests under the policy were several rather than joint regardless of
the form of property ownership, and concluded that the innocent
spouse should not be precluded from recovery by the fraudulent
acts of the culpable spouse." "
Citing Judge McCune's opinion in Opat as a newly announced
change in the law is a recent decision in the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas.14 4 In this case, the plaintiff's husband, a
fireman, was found to have caused the fire that destroyed the
couple's house. The innocent spouse was not implicated in the fire
and sought to recover one-half of the insurance proceeds on the
residence. 4 5 Judge Barry, with Judge Narick concurring, examined
the decision in Opat and announced that he was not bound by the
district court opinion. However, the court agreed that the defini-
tion of "insured" in the instant case was not dissimilar to that used
in the insurance policy in Opat.1" Further, Judge Barry observed
that the "Concealment, Fraud" provision was substantially similar
to the provision examined in Giacobetti."
7
Applying the rules of contract construction, Judge Barry found
it possible that the provisions in the insurance policy relating to
fraud could void the entire policy. Regardless, he resolved the am-
biguities in favor of the innocent spouse by finding that the obliga-
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1327. Judge McCune noted that Matyuf, which was factually similar, was a
common pleas court decision and thus he was not bound by its holding unless it reflected a
consensus of legal thought; he found that it did not. Id.
144. Coleman v. Allstate Ins., No. GD 80-13869 (Allegheny Co. Court of Common
Pleas; July 13, 1983). The court in this case did not cite Giacobetti.
145. Id. at 1, 11-12.
146. Id. at 14. In Opat, the policy stated: "'Insured' means (1) the Named Insured
stated in the declarations of the policy;, [and] (2) if residents of the Named Insured's house-
hold, his spouse, the relatives of either, and any other person under the age of twenty-one in
the case of any insured ...." 542 F. Supp. at 1326. Judge Barry noted that under the
Coleman policy "Insured Person" was defined as "you and, if a resident of your household,
any dependent person in your care." No. GD 80-13869 at 14. Compare supra note 99 with
supra note 106.
147. No. GD 80-13869 at 14. See supra note 23.
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tions under the policy were several rather than joint.1 48 Addition-
ally, in analyzing the joint contractual obligation, Judge Barry
quoted extensively from the Maryland Court of Appeals opinion in
Molloy,' "49 indicating that the form of property ownership is of no
consequence, especially in tenants by the entireties, as each owner
possesses an undivided interest in the whole.1 50 As a result, if the
no-recovery jurisdictions base their holdings on the relationship
between the form of property ownership and the nature of the con-
tractual obligation, then there is no valid reason to distinguish
spouses holding property jointly from other co-owners. 51 Judge
Barry, choosing to align himself "with the growing number of
courts which set a more analytically persuasive tack,"' 52 held there
was no bar to permitting recovery to the innocent spouse.18 Conse-
quently, Judge Barry found that denying recovery to the guilty in-
sured while permitting the innocent insured recovery is consistent
with public policy.
In Giacobetti, Chief Justice Roberts has impliedly agreed with
the influential new majority rule that innocent co-insureds may re-
cover, despite the intentional destruction by the other co-in-
sured.1 5 4 Giacobetti is consistent with the recent pro-recovery line
of thinking but the court fails to cite any precedent in support of
its ruling, mentioning not once the Pennsylvania cases or decisions
of other jurisdictions that have raised and resolved the issue.
The court did, however, give effect to the public policy argument
that a person may not profit from his crime, by having denied re-
covery of the share of insurance proceeds that would have flowed
to Harry Kracoff and his children or issue. The Giacobetti court
was justified in prohibiting recovery by Harry Kracoff, but its de-
nial of recovery to innocent minors and unborn remaindermen,
whose rights of recovery the court perceived as dependent upon
Harry Kracoff's right to recover, was perhaps not the most desira-
ble result.
Though not controlling, Mercantile addressed this issue and
held that the father's/co-trustee's fraudulent act was not imputa-
148. No. GD 80-13869 at 16.
149. 291 Md. 139, 150, 433 A.2d 1135, 1141 (1981). See supra note 137 and accompa-
nying text.
150. No. GD 80-13869 at 18.
151. 291 Md. at 150, 433 A.2d at 1141.
152. No. GD 80-13869 at 19.
153. Id.
154. 457 A.2d at 854.
1180 Vol. 22:1163
Recent Decisions
ble to the son, the innocent remainderman. 1'" The Mercantile
court reasoned that neither the son nor Mercantile, the other trus-
tee, had any knowledge of the father's actions. 156 Consequently, the
proceeds payable by the insurer in Mercantile were held for the
father's descendants and none of the proceeds could be expended
for the benefit of the fraudulent co-insured father. The court
adopted this approach as being in accord with "sound principles of
trust and property law.'
57
Similarly, in Giacobetti, there was no evidence or any finding by
the court that any trustee other than Harry Kracoff, or any benefi-
ciary of the remainder interest, either started or was involved with
the fire.'"5 The Giacobetti court could have more fully effectuated
stated public policy by permitting the innocent remaindermen to
recover. This could have been carried out by allowing the innocent
co-trustees to hold Harry's share of the recovery proceeds for the
benefit of Harry's descendants in the form of a constructive trust,
as was done in Mercantile. Harry, personally, would have received
absolutely no benefit had the Manusov Family Trust recovered the
entire proceeds of the fire insurance policy. This result was ap-
proved by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 59 where it stated
that mere family relationship to the arsonist which does not be-
stow a direct benefit in the insurance proceeds does not bar
recovery. 60
The court's reasoning in allowing recovery to the other co-trust-
ees was also based on the policy designation under the insured's
name, "as their interest may appear," which indicated the diverse
interests of several persons in the same property."" This designa-
tion referred to the interests of the co-insureds as they existed at
155. 376 F.2d at 506.
156. Id.
157. Id. The court cited G. BOGERT, TRUST & TRUsTEEs § 471 (2d ed. 1960) (applying
the theory of constructive trusts as a device to compel one who unfairly holds a property
interest by reason of unjust, unconscionable, or unlawful means to convey that interest to
another to whom it justly belongs), and RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 138 (1936) (for the
proposition that the owner of a life estate in possession or in reversion has a duty not to act
upon the land in which his estate for life exists so that his conduct does not diminish the
market value for all of the persons who own the interest which will, or may, take effect in
possession after the termination of the estate for life).
158. Brief for Appellant at 6, Giacobetti v. Insurance Placement Facility of Pa., 457
A.2d 853 (Pa. 1983).
159. See Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins., 386 A.2d 329 (Me. 1978).
160. Id. at 332.
161. 457 A.2d at 855. See supra note 14.
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the time of the loss.' 62 Since 1812,63 Pennsylvania has followed the
presumption that a conveyance or devise to two or more persons,
not husband and wife, carries with it no right of survivorship un-
less clearly expressed. 64 Further, in the Commonwealth, unless the
terms of an agreement call for a joint tenancy, a tenancy in com-
mon will be presumed. 6 The Manusov Family Trust indenture,
based on the reported facts, did not expressly or by necessary im-
plication call for a joint tenancy. Therefore the interests of the in-
nocent co-trustees were easily divisible and separable from the in-
terests of Harry Kracoff so that there was no conceptual basis for
prohibiting recovery by the innocent co-trustees.
In commenting on the situation where one of several tenants in
common committed arson, the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire '6 stated that the test for recovery is what the reasonable "in-
sured" understood the terms of the policy to mean. The Giacobetti
court, though not expressly giving effect to the "reasonable expec-
tation" theory, 6 7 concluded that the "Concealment, Fraud" provi-
sion in the policy did not permit the insurer, to deny proceeds to
the trust' because the conduct of Harry Kracoff was unilateral
and not deemed an act of the trust.6 9 The reasonable expectations
of the innocent co-trustees were that they would not be barred by
the "fraudulent and unauthorized" act of the co-trustee, Harry
Kracoff.1
7 0
The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Giacobetti
162. New Hampshire Ins. v. American Employers Ins., 492 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Kan.
1972).
163. Act of March 31, 1812 (An Act Concerning Joint Tenancy), Pub. L. No. 259 § 1,
20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 121, transferred to 68 PA. STAT. ANN. § 110 (1974).
164. See Margarite v. Ewald, 252 Pa. Super. 244, 247, 381 A.2d 480, 482 (1977) (deed
conveying real property to a husband and wife and a third party was held to create a ten-
ancy by the entireties between the married couple, and their one-half interest was held in
common in relation to the third person, and not as tenants in common with right of survi-
vorship). See also Zomisky v. Zamiska, 449 Pa. 239, 241, 296 A.2d 722, 723 (1972) (deed
creating a joint tenancy with right of survivorship); Michael Estate, 421 Pa. 207, 211, 218
A.2d 338 (1966) (deed creating a tenancy in common as between two married couples).
165. Margarite, 252 Pa. Super. at 247, 381 A.2d at 482. See generally, Pennsylvania
Bank and Trust Co. v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771 (1968) and Maxwell v. Saylor,
359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948).
166. See generally Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121 (1942);
see supra note 91.
167. See supra note 91.
168. 457 A.2d at 857.
169. Id.
170. Brief for Appellant at 8, Giacobetti v. Insurance Placement Facility of Pa., 457
A.2d 853 (Pa. 1983).
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sets the stage for the logical conversion of Pennsylvania to the bet-
ter reasoned position in allowing the recovery of insurance pro-
ceeds to innocent co-insureds. Chief Justice Robert's opinion gives
guidance between the lines as to what theory will be acceptable
when this issue arises, but until that guidance is expressly stated
and firmly established by the supreme court, the wrongful conduct
of a co-insured may continue to bar enjoyment by innocent co-in-
sureds of fire insurance proceeds in Pennsylvania.
Robert M. Danenberg

